Key Findings
- Operation Sindoor (May 2025) shattered India’s “indispensability” myth — Trump claiming credit for the India-Pakistan ceasefire humiliated Modi and exposed India’s inability to manage its own regional conflicts
- Trump’s 50% tariffs on India vs 20% on Bangladesh — The August 2025 trade crisis gave Bangladesh a massive competitive advantage; garment exports surged 21% as orders shifted from India
- India’s “strategic autonomy” publicly mocked — Trump called India a “dead economy” and “Russia’s laundromat”; the 2025 India-US relationship hit its lowest point despite “bromance” rhetoric
- Bangladesh now more competitive than India in US market — India faces 66.5% effective tariff rate while Bangladesh faces 36.5%; Chinese manufacturers are relocating to Bangladesh
- The India lens is breaking in real-time — Pakistan’s Army Chief Munir visited the White House twice in 2025; India no longer enjoys privileged Washington access
The India-First Architecture
On November 12, 2024, Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Donald Lu met with Bangladesh’s Foreign Affairs Adviser Touhid Hossain in Dhaka — the highest-level US diplomatic visit since the August revolution. The meeting signaled a potential shift in how Washington approaches Bangladesh: as a partner in its own right, rather than through the traditional India-first lens.
For two decades, American policy toward South Asia has been structured around a simple premise: India is the anchor, and everyone else is secondary. This architecture emerged from the 2005 US-India Civil Nuclear Agreement and consolidated through successive administrations.
As former Ambassador Howard Schaffer noted in his analysis of US South Asia policy: “Washington’s bandwidth for South Asia has been overwhelmingly consumed by the India relationship, leaving Bangladesh as an afterthought despite its strategic significance.” The logic was straightforward: India’s size, democratic credentials, and potential as a China counterweight made it the natural partner. Pakistan was a problem to be managed. Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and others barely registered as independent considerations.
Under this framework, Washington’s engagement with Bangladesh was filtered through a single question: does this serve or complicate the India relationship?
The Biden Administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy
The 2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy made this hierarchy explicit. India received extensive treatment as a “like-minded partner” essential to regional architecture:
“We will support India’s continued rise and regional leadership… We will continue to build on our Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership, working with India bilaterally and through groupings such as the Quad.”
Bangladesh appeared exactly once in the document, grouped with other nations as an afterthought. The message was clear: Washington engages with India as a strategic partner; it engages with Bangladesh as part of “the region.”
This was not an oversight but deliberate policy. The assumption was that India-aligned governments in neighboring states served American interests. Sheikh Hasina’s pro-India orientation made Bangladesh a low-priority, low-maintenance relationship — important for garment imports and remittances but not requiring strategic attention.
The Democracy Problem
The India-first framework created an awkward contradiction: the United States officially champions democracy, but its primary South Asian partner was allied with increasingly authoritarian regimes.
Sheikh Hasina’s government conducted three consecutive fraudulent elections:
| Election | Opposition Status | International Assessment |
|---|---|---|
| 2014 | BNP boycotted | Uncontested; no international observers |
| 2018 | Opposition participated | Widespread irregularities; stuffed ballots; overnight rigging |
| 2024 | BNP banned from participating | Facade election; predetermined outcome |
American responses were notably muted. Washington issued pro forma statements about electoral concerns but took no meaningful action. The priority was maintaining the India-aligned government, not Bangladeshi democracy.
The Sanctions Exception
The one significant US action — 2021 sanctions on the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) for extrajudicial killings — illustrated the limits of the India-first framework. The sanctions angered both Dhaka and Delhi. India viewed criticism of its ally as indirect criticism of Indian influence. The sanctions were maintained but not expanded, reflecting Washington’s reluctance to seriously pressure an India-aligned government.
How India-First Backfired
The India-first approach created openings that concerned Washington more than the democratic backsliding it enabled.
The China Opening
As the United States deferred to India on Bangladesh policy, China expanded its presence:
- Infrastructure Investment: China became Bangladesh’s largest infrastructure partner, financing the Padma Bridge, Payra Port, and Dhaka Metro
- Defense Sales: Chinese submarines, frigates, and military equipment filled gaps left by Western reluctance to engage
- Economic Integration: Belt and Road Initiative projects created structural ties that persist regardless of government
The Russia Opening
Similarly, Russia deepened engagement:
- Rooppur Nuclear Plant: A $12 billion project creating long-term Russian-Bangladeshi ties
- Defense Cooperation: Military equipment sales and training programs
The Stimson Center observed: “U.S. policies in the past pushed Bangladesh toward other great powers — namely, China and Russia.”
By treating Bangladesh as an India appendage rather than a nation worth cultivating independently, Washington created the very outcomes it sought to prevent.
The August 2024 Disruption
Sheikh Hasina’s fall on August 5, 2024, shattered the India-first framework’s assumptions. The interim government under Muhammad Yunus was not automatically aligned with India. Suddenly, Bangladesh required independent engagement.
The policy community began reassessing. The Stimson Center argued:
“U.S. foreign policy toward South Asia’s sub-regions and its diverse populations would be best served by treating each nation, including Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan, on individual terms, not through the legacy framework of Cold War-era regional blocs or contemporary Indo-Pacific power competition.”
This represented a potential paradigm shift: engaging Bangladesh based on bilateral interests rather than India-mediated calculations.
2025: The Year India’s Indispensability Myth Collapsed
The events of 2025 delivered a series of blows to the India-first framework that would have been unimaginable a year earlier. For Bangladesh, these developments represent a historic opportunity.
Operation Sindoor and India’s Humiliation (April-May 2025)
On April 22, 2025, gunmen killed 26 people near Pahalgam in Indian-administered Kashmir — 25 were Hindu tourists. The attack occurred during US Vice President J.D. Vance’s official visit to New Delhi.
India responded with Operation Sindoor (May 6-7, 2025): drone and missile strikes on nine alleged terrorist targets in Pakistan and Pakistani-held Kashmir — India’s most extensive military action since 1971. Pakistan retaliated with the heaviest shelling since the 1971 war.
Then came the humiliation.
On May 10, 2025, President Trump announced on social media that the US had “mediated” an immediate ceasefire between India and Pakistan. India desperately denied American involvement, with government sources insisting the ceasefire was “worked out directly between the two countries.”
Trump repeatedly claimed credit, embarrassing Indian officials. As the Lowy Institute observed: “Modi faces a ’re-hyphenation’ challenge after Trump’s Kashmir mediation claims.” India had spent decades ensuring Kashmir stayed off the international agenda — and Trump undid that with a single Truth Social post.
The strategic implications were devastating:
“The de-escalation temporarily cooled nuclear-tinged hostilities, but it ‘humiliatingly underscored India’s reliance on external powers to manage its regional conflicts — a significant, if not damning, indictment of its strategic autonomy.’”
Key lesson for Bangladesh: India cannot even manage its own backyard without American intervention. The “regional leader” needed a bailout.
The 50% Tariff Hammer (August 2025)
If Operation Sindoor wounded India’s pride, Trump’s tariffs attacked its economy.
In August 2025, the United States imposed 50% tariffs on India — combining a 25% “reciprocal” tariff with an additional 25% penalty for India’s continued Russian oil purchases. Trump publicly mocked India as a “dead economy” and “Russia’s laundromat.”
India responded that the measures were “unfair, unjustified and unreasonable,” asserting its energy policy reflects “strategic autonomy.”
The strategic autonomy defense didn’t work. As Foreign Policy noted:
“President Trump’s decision to levy heavy tariffs on India punctured the illusion that personal chemistry between Modi and Trump could immunize India from the latter’s transactional instincts. The public humiliation and taunts… underlined a hard truth: influence is partly a function of perceived indispensability.”
Meanwhile, Bangladesh received only a 20% tariff — less than half of India’s rate.
The Tariff Math Favors Bangladesh
| Country | Reciprocal Tariff | Existing Duty | Effective Rate |
|---|---|---|---|
| India | 50% | 16.5% | 66.5% |
| Bangladesh | 20% | 16.5% | 36.5% |
| Differential | — | — | 30 percentage points |
The results were immediate:
- Bangladesh garment exports to US surged 21% in the first five months of 2025
- Orders shifted from India to Bangladesh as buyers sought lower-tariff sources
- Chinese manufacturers began relocating to Bangladesh to access US market
- Indian garment industry lost competitiveness practically overnight
As one Bangladeshi exporter noted: “Our factory has seen a surge in orders, mostly from US buyers. Last year, we exported 3 lakh down jackets to a US buyer. This time, that buyer wants to increase the order to 5 lakh pieces.”
India-US Relations at Historic Low
Despite Modi’s February 2025 Washington visit and the announced “Mission 500” initiative targeting $500 billion in bilateral trade, the relationship collapsed:
- Strategic autonomy mocked: Trump explicitly targeted India for its Russia ties
- Re-hyphenation: Pakistan’s Army Chief Asim Munir visited the White House twice since the May conflict — something unthinkable in the India-first era
- Quad partnership strained: India’s “neither strategic nor autonomous” approach alienated partners
- Trust deficit: As the East Asia Forum noted, “it has become clear to India’s leadership just how unpredictable American politics are”
2025 has been called “Modi’s most difficult foreign-policy year” since 2014.
What This Means for Bangladesh
The collapse of India’s privileged position creates unprecedented openings:
- Tariff advantage: Bangladesh is now significantly more competitive than India in the US market
- Investment magnet: Chinese and other manufacturers seeking US market access are looking at Bangladesh, not India
- Strategic attention: Washington can no longer assume India manages the region; Bangladesh matters independently
- Diplomatic space: With India humiliated and distracted, Bangladesh has more room to maneuver
- Narrative shift: India’s “indispensability” is exposed as myth; alternatives exist
The New Bilateral Dynamics
Trade Negotiations
The most concrete evidence of changed dynamics came through trade. In early 2025, Bangladesh secured a 20% tariff rate through direct negotiation with Washington — an outcome achieved through bilateral engagement rather than India-filtered diplomacy. When India received 50% tariffs, Bangladesh’s 20% rate became a massive competitive advantage.
This contrasted sharply with previous patterns where Bangladesh’s trade interests were subordinated to broader India relationship management.
Democracy Support
The United States has engaged directly with the interim government on democratic transition, supporting:
- Electoral reform processes
- Judicial system reconstruction
- Anti-corruption initiatives
- Press freedom restoration
This engagement treats Bangladesh as a democracy partner in its own right, not merely as India’s responsibility.
Security Dialogue
Washington has initiated direct security conversations with Dhaka covering:
- Bay of Bengal maritime security
- Counterterrorism cooperation
- Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
- Regional stability
These discussions proceed bilaterally rather than through India-mediated frameworks.
The Friction with Delhi
The bilateral approach has created friction with India. Delhi views American engagement with a non-Hasina Bangladesh as potentially threatening to Indian regional primacy.
Specific tensions include:
-
Electoral Criticism Legacy: US criticism of Hasina’s elections “rankled New Delhi,” which saw it as interference in India’s sphere of influence
-
Direct Engagement Concerns: Indian strategists worry that US-Bangladesh bilateral ties could develop independent of Indian interests
-
Strategic Autonomy Support: American encouragement of Bangladeshi strategic autonomy implicitly challenges Indian regional primacy
-
China Narrative Competition: India frames Bangladesh’s China ties as threatening; US engagement that doesn’t share this framing creates divergence
The question is whether Washington will maintain bilateral engagement when it conflicts with India preferences, or revert to India-first defaults under pressure.
Sustainability Questions
Several factors will determine whether the bilateral approach persists:
Administration Change
Different US administrations have different South Asia priorities. A future administration may:
- Return to India-first frameworks as the path of least resistance
- Prioritize India relationship over Bangladesh bilateral ties
- Deprioritize South Asia entirely in favor of other regions
India Lobbying
India maintains sophisticated influence operations in Washington:
- Strong diaspora political engagement
- Well-funded think tank relationships
- Congressional caucus cultivation
- Defense industry connections
Bangladesh’s Washington presence is comparatively minimal. If bilateral engagement creates India friction, the lobbying asymmetry may push policy back toward India-first defaults.
Bangladesh Government Transition
The interim government’s duration is uncertain. A future elected government’s orientation will affect US engagement:
- India-aligned government: May return to pre-August 2024 patterns
- Independent government: Would reinforce bilateral approach value
- Unstable government: May deprioritize Bangladesh in US calculations
Regional Dynamics
Broader regional developments will shape US choices:
- China assertiveness: May increase US interest in cultivating Bangladesh independently
- India-Pakistan tensions: May consume US South Asia bandwidth
- Indo-Pacific competition: May elevate or subordinate Bangladesh depending on framing
What Bangladesh Must Do
To lock in bilateral engagement, Bangladesh must demonstrate independent value to US interests:
Articulate Strategic Value
Bangladesh must clearly communicate what it offers:
- Bay of Bengal geography: Strategic position for Indo-Pacific maritime security
- Market access: 170 million consumers for American goods and services
- Labor supply: Continued garment sector partnership and potential expansion
- Blue Economy: Maritime economic zone partnership potential
- Democratic model: Successful democratic transition as regional example
Build Washington Presence
Bangladesh needs sustained Washington engagement:
- Professional embassy and diplomatic corps
- Think tank relationships and research partnerships
- Congressional engagement beyond textile caucus
- Business community mobilization
- Diaspora political organization
Deliver Bilateral Wins
Concrete cooperation demonstrates relationship value:
- Trade agreement progress
- Security cooperation achievements
- Climate partnership initiatives
- Development project successes
Maintain Strategic Autonomy
Bangladesh must avoid appearing to simply flip from India’s orbit to any other power’s orbit. The value proposition is an independent Bangladesh that engages all powers on its own terms — not a client state changing patrons.
The Stakes
The outcome of this policy evolution will shape Bangladesh’s strategic space for decades:
If bilateral engagement consolidates:
- Bangladesh gains direct channel to world’s largest economy and security provider
- Strategic autonomy becomes sustainable through diversified relationships
- India lens breaks, establishing precedent for independent treatment
If India-first framework returns:
- Bangladesh reverts to appendage status in US calculations
- Strategic autonomy is constrained by India-mediated relationships
- Future governments face same structural limitations as pre-2024 period
Conclusion: A Window, Not a Guarantee
The post-August 2024 shift toward bilateral US-Bangladesh engagement represents an opportunity, not an accomplishment. The India-first framework was two decades in construction; it will not dissolve from one government transition.
Washington’s policy community is debating Bangladesh’s proper place in US strategy. Some advocate sustained bilateral engagement; others view the India relationship as paramount. The outcome is not predetermined.
Bangladesh has a window to demonstrate independent value, build Washington relationships, and lock in bilateral patterns before policy reverts to default settings. Whether Dhaka uses this window effectively will determine whether the India lens breaks — or simply pauses before reasserting itself.
The Bottom Line
This Delta Dispatch represents the analysis of the Inqilab Delta Forum research team.
Sources:
- The White House, “Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States,” February 2022.
- Stimson Center, “Rethinking U.S. South Asia Policy,” Policy Brief, December 2024.
- US Department of State, “Assistant Secretary Lu’s Visit to Bangladesh,” Press Release, November 2024.
- Congressional Research Service, “India-Pakistan Conflict in Spring 2025,” IF13000, May 2025.
- Wikipedia, “2025 India-Pakistan Crisis,” accessed December 2025.
- Al Jazeera, “India’s Modi Tells Trump There Was No US Mediation in Pakistan Truce,” June 2025.
- Foreign Policy, “India’s Strategic Autonomy Doesn’t Work in a Great Power World,” November 2025.
- East Asia Forum, “Strained India-US Relations Under Trump 2.0 Test India’s Strategic Autonomy,” December 2025.
- Lowy Institute, “India-Pakistan Ceasefire: Modi Faces Re-Hyphenation Challenge,” May 2025.
- The Business Standard, “Trump’s Tariff War 2.0: A Windfall for Bangladesh?” August 2025.
- The Daily Star, “Tariff Math Favours Bangladesh in Shifting US Trade Landscape,” August 2025.
- Lightcastle Partners, “US Tariffs: Opportunities for Bangladesh’s Apparel Exports,” August 2025.
- Wikipedia, “2025 United States-India Diplomatic and Trade Crisis,” accessed December 2025.
- Eurasia Review, “Why 2025 Has Been Modi’s Most Difficult Foreign-Policy Year?” December 2025.
Related Analysis:
- The India Lens: Why Great Powers Cannot See Bangladesh — The comprehensive framework explaining how major powers filter Bangladesh through India
- Japan’s Bangladesh Paradox: Investments for India’s Benefit? — Examining whether Japanese investments serve India or Bangladesh
- Russia’s Delhi Deference: How India Mediates Bangladesh-Moscow Relations — Analyzing Russia’s historical deference to India on Bangladesh policy