Key Findings
- EU visa centers for Bangladeshis operate from New Delhi — Bangladeshi citizens seeking European visas must often process through infrastructure located in India
- Chief Adviser Yunus raised this directly with EU officials — The request to relocate visa services to Dhaka symbolizes Bangladesh’s demand for sovereign treatment
- EU maintains “Strategic Partnership” with India but not Bangladesh — The partnership hierarchy leaves Bangladesh as a secondary consideration in EU South Asia policy
- LDC graduation threatens trade access — Bangladesh faces loss of Everything But Arms duty-free access in 2026, its most significant EU relationship challenge
- The dual “safe country” designation — EU designating both Bangladesh and India as “safe countries” for asylum illustrates how Brussels treats them as a paired set
The Symbolic Indignity
On December 15, 2024, Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus met with European Commission Vice President Margrethe Vestager in Brussels. Among the issues raised was one that captured the essence of Bangladesh’s struggle for diplomatic recognition: the location of EU visa processing centers. For many Bangladeshi citizens seeking to visit Europe, the journey begins not in Dhaka, but in New Delhi.
When a Bangladeshi citizen needs a visa to visit Europe, they face an extraordinary requirement: many must travel to New Delhi to apply. The European Union, for various member state visa applications, operates processing centers in India that handle Bangladesh applications. A citizen of a sovereign nation of 170 million people must seek permission to visit Europe from infrastructure located in a neighboring country.
As Dr. Imtiaz Ahmed, Professor of International Relations at Dhaka University, observed: “The visa center arrangement is emblematic of how European institutions have historically viewed Bangladesh — not as a sovereign actor deserving dedicated infrastructure, but as an appendage to larger regional powers.”
This arrangement may have administrative rationale — consolidating South Asian visa processing for efficiency. But its symbolism is unmistakable: Bangladesh is not important enough for dedicated infrastructure. Its citizens must filter their European aspirations through Indian territory.
Chief Adviser Yunus’s direct request to relocate visa services to Dhaka was both practical — reducing cost and inconvenience for Bangladeshi applicants — and symbolic: Bangladesh demanding to be treated as an independent nation rather than an appendage of India.
The Partnership Hierarchy
The visa center issue reflects a broader hierarchy in EU South Asia policy:
The Strategic Partnership Gap
The European Union maintains “Strategic Partnerships” with select countries globally — comprehensive frameworks covering politics, economics, security, and culture. India has this status. Bangladesh does not.
The EU-India Strategic Partnership includes:
- Annual summits at heads of government level
- Regular foreign affairs and defense dialogues
- Trade and investment negotiations
- Technology and innovation cooperation
- Climate and energy partnerships
- People-to-people exchanges
EU-Bangladesh relations lack equivalent architecture. The relationship is structured primarily around:
- Trade preferences (GSP/EBA)
- Development assistance
- Occasional political dialogue
- Migration and readmission issues
The asymmetry is clear: India is a partner in EU policy; Bangladesh is a recipient of it.
The Attention Gap
EU political attention follows the partnership hierarchy:
| Issue | India | Bangladesh |
|---|---|---|
| Summit Level | Annual EU-India summits | No equivalent |
| Trade Negotiations | FTA negotiations ongoing | GSP technical management |
| Strategic Dialogue | Regular | Occasional |
| Political Visibility | High | Low |
| Media Coverage | Significant | Minimal |
When European Commission presidents visit South Asia, they go to Delhi. Bangladesh receives development ministers and trade commissioners — important, but not equivalent.
The Trade Relationship
Trade is the EU-Bangladesh relationship’s center of gravity — and its most vulnerable point.
Everything But Arms
Bangladesh currently benefits from the Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative, which provides duty-free, quota-free access to EU markets for Least Developed Countries (LDCs). This preference has been essential for Bangladesh’s garment industry development.
Key statistics:
- EU is Bangladesh’s largest export market
- Garments represent over 80% of Bangladesh-EU trade
- Duty-free access provides approximately 12% cost advantage
- Millions of Bangladeshi jobs depend on EU market access
The LDC Graduation Crisis
Bangladesh is scheduled to graduate from LDC status in 2026. This graduation reflects development progress — but it threatens the trade preferences that enabled that progress.
Upon graduation:
- EBA preferences end after a three-year transition
- Bangladesh faces Standard GSP rates (lower preferences)
- Or must qualify for GSP+ (requires ratifying 27 conventions)
- Or negotiates a Free Trade Agreement
Each option presents challenges:
| Option | Requirements | Challenges |
|---|---|---|
| Standard GSP | None | Significantly reduced preferences; competitive disadvantage |
| GSP+ | 27 convention ratifications | Labor, human rights, governance requirements may be difficult |
| FTA | Comprehensive negotiation | EU prioritizes larger partners; negotiations take years |
The Urgency Gap
Despite looming graduation, EU-Bangladesh trade discussions have proceeded without urgency. Compare:
- EU-India FTA: High-level political priority, regular negotiating rounds, Commission engagement
- EU-Bangladesh GSP transition: Technical-level discussions, limited political attention, unclear timeline
The asymmetry reflects the partnership hierarchy. India matters enough for political priority; Bangladesh is managed at technical level.
The Safe Country Designation
In 2024, the EU designated both Bangladesh and India as “safe countries of origin” for asylum purposes. Applicants from safe countries face expedited processing and higher rejection rates — the designation signals that asylum claims are likely unfounded.
The dual designation is notable for what it reveals:
The Pairing Instinct
The EU treats Bangladesh and India as a paired set — making the same designation simultaneously. This reflects the tendency to see Bangladesh through the India lens rather than assessing independently.
Bangladesh and India have very different human rights situations, political systems, and asylum-relevant conditions. Treating them identically suggests inadequate independent assessment.
The Practical Impact
For Bangladeshis:
- Asylum claims face expedited (and often cursory) processing
- Higher rejection rates compared to non-safe country applicants
- Reduced access to European protection for genuine cases
- Incentive for irregular migration routes
The Political Message
The safe country designation sends a political message: Bangladesh does not produce refugees with legitimate claims. Coming amid democratic backsliding under Hasina (2024 designation predated August), this message was questionable.
The Yunus Government’s Opportunity
The fall of Sheikh Hasina creates an opportunity for EU-Bangladesh relationship reset.
What Yunus Has Signaled
Chief Adviser Yunus has engaged EU officials on several fronts:
- Visa Centers: Direct request to relocate services to Dhaka
- Trade Transition: Urgent discussions on post-LDC arrangements
- Democratic Partnership: Positioning Bangladesh as democracy success story
- Investment: Seeking European economic engagement
What Bangladesh Should Demand
Bangladesh should pursue a transformed relationship with Europe:
1. Strategic Partnership Status
Request EU-Bangladesh Strategic Partnership equivalent to EU-India:
- Annual summit-level meetings
- Comprehensive dialogue architecture
- Political recognition of Bangladesh’s importance
2. Trade Transition Resolution
Resolve the GSP transition with favorable terms:
- Extended transition period beyond standard three years
- GSP+ qualification support
- Clear pathway to eventual FTA
- Recognition of graduation as success, not abandonment
3. Visa Service Sovereignty
Relocate all visa services to Dhaka:
- Dedicated infrastructure for Bangladeshi applicants
- Appropriate staffing and processing capacity
- Symbolic recognition of sovereignty
4. Development Partnership Evolution
Transform from recipient to partner:
- Climate cooperation as mutual interest
- Technology partnerships
- Educational exchanges
- Research collaboration
5. Political Dialogue Upgrade
Regular political engagement at senior levels:
- Foreign minister exchanges
- Parliamentary relationships
- Civil society engagement
- Media and public diplomacy
The European Interest
A transformed EU-Bangladesh relationship serves European interests:
Market Diversification
Bangladesh offers:
- 170 million consumers
- Growing middle class
- Strategic supply chain alternative to China
- Blue economy opportunities
Migration Management
A stable, prosperous Bangladesh means:
- Reduced irregular migration pressure
- Functional readmission agreements
- Development partnership over crisis management
Climate Partnership
Bangladesh is:
- Acutely vulnerable to climate change
- Deeply experienced in adaptation
- Potential partner in climate finance and technology
Democratic Example
A successful Bangladeshi democratic transition:
- Demonstrates democratic resilience in South Asia
- Provides alternative to authoritarian models
- Validates European values investment
Strategic Diversification
Independent EU-Bangladesh ties:
- Reduce EU dependence on India relationship
- Provide alternative engagement channels in South Asia
- Enhance EU regional positioning
The Path to Change
Transforming EU-Bangladesh relations requires action on multiple fronts:
In Brussels
- Elevate Bangladesh in EU South Asia strategy
- Designate relationship enhancement as political priority
- Appoint senior official as Bangladesh relationship champion
- Engage European Parliament on Bangladesh issues
In Member State Capitals
- Bilateral relationship building with key EU members
- Trade ministry engagement on GSP transition
- Foreign ministry engagement on strategic issues
- Development ministry engagement on partnership evolution
In Dhaka
- Professional diplomatic corps for European engagement
- Think tank relationships with European policy community
- Business community mobilization
- Diaspora organization for European advocacy
Through Public Diplomacy
- Media engagement in European markets
- Cultural diplomacy initiatives
- Educational exchanges
- Tourism promotion
What Success Looks Like
A transformed EU-Bangladesh relationship would feature:
Institutional Architecture
- EU-Bangladesh Strategic Partnership
- Annual summit-level meetings
- Regular ministerial dialogues
- Parliamentary exchanges
Trade Resolution
- GSP+ qualification or FTA progress
- Extended transition period
- Continued market access competitiveness
- Investment promotion
Practical Sovereignty
- All visa services in Dhaka
- Direct flights to European capitals
- Banking and financial service access
- Educational program access
Political Recognition
- Bangladesh as independent actor in EU South Asia policy
- Regular high-level visits
- Media coverage proportionate to importance
- Partnership rather than patronage framing
Conclusion: Demanding to Be Seen
The visa center issue is a symbol, not the substance. But symbols matter. When Bangladeshi citizens must travel to New Delhi for European visas, the message is clear: you are not important enough for your own infrastructure. Your sovereignty is filtered through India.
The EU-Bangladesh relationship suffers from the same India lens that afflicts other major powers’ engagement. Brussels sees India as the strategic priority; Bangladesh is managed, not partnered.
The post-August 2024 moment offers opportunity for change. A Bangladesh demanding sovereign treatment, articulating independent value, and insisting on partnership rather than patronage can transform the relationship. But the initiative must come from Dhaka.
The EU will not spontaneously upgrade Bangladesh’s status. Brussels economizes on attention; the path of least resistance runs through Delhi. Bangladesh must make the alternative path — direct engagement, bilateral partnership, sovereign treatment — easier than the India-filtered default.
The visa center is where to start. Move the infrastructure to Dhaka. Treat Bangladeshi citizens as citizens of a sovereign nation, not supplicants filtering through India. Let that symbolic victory begin a broader transformation.
The Bottom Line
This Delta Dispatch represents the analysis of the Inqilab Delta Forum research team.
Sources:
- European External Action Service, “EU-India Strategic Partnership: A Roadmap to 2025,” Brussels, 2020.
- European Commission, “Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP),” Trade Policy Documentation, 2024.
- European Parliament, “Bangladesh’s LDC Graduation: Trade Implications,” Briefing Paper, November 2024.
- Eurasia Review, “EU-Bangladesh Relations: Beyond Trade Preferences,” December 2024.
- Bangladesh Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Chief Adviser’s Brussels Visit,” Press Release, December 2024.
- Centre for Policy Dialogue, “Bangladesh’s Post-LDC Trade Strategy with the EU,” CPR Policy Brief, 2024.
Related Analysis:
- The India Lens: Why Great Powers Cannot See Bangladesh — The comprehensive framework explaining how major powers filter Bangladesh through India
- America’s South Asia Reset: From India-First to Bilateral Pragmatism — How US policy is shifting from treating Bangladesh as an India appendage
- Japan’s Bangladesh Paradox: Investments for India’s Benefit? — Examining whether Japanese investments serve India or Bangladesh
- Russia’s Delhi Deference: How India Mediates Bangladesh-Moscow Relations — Analyzing Russia’s historical deference to India on Bangladesh policy