The India Lens: Why Great Powers Cannot See Bangladesh

The Invisible Country

On December 15, 2024, Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus met with European Union officials in Brussels to discuss Bangladesh’s post-transition relationship with Europe. Among his requests was one that carried symbolic weight far beyond its administrative substance: relocate EU visa processing centers from New Delhi to Dhaka. The request highlighted a structural reality that has defined Bangladesh’s international relations for decades.

In February 2022, the Biden administration released its Indo-Pacific Strategy, a document meant to define American engagement with the world’s most dynamic region. India received extensive treatment as a “like-minded partner” and cornerstone of the strategy. The document explicitly aimed to “support India’s continued rise and regional leadership.”

Bangladesh — a nation of 170 million people, the world’s second-largest garment exporter, strategically positioned at the head of the Bay of Bengal — was mentioned exactly once, in passing, grouped with other countries as secondary considerations.

This is not an oversight. It is policy. As Dr. Satu Limaye, Vice President of the East-West Center, observed in a December 2024 analysis: “South Asian states other than India have traditionally been viewed through Delhi’s lens in Washington policy circles.” This reflects a systematic pattern across all major power centers: the treatment of Bangladesh not as an independent actor in international relations, but as a subset of India policy — viewed through what we call the “India lens.”

The Structure of Invisibility

The India lens operates through several mechanisms across different capitals:

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    subgraph Powers["Major Power Centers"]
        US["United States"]
        JP["Japan"]
        RU["Russia"]
        EU["European Union"]
    end

    subgraph Lens["The India Lens"]
        IN["INDIA
Strategic Priority"]
    end

    subgraph Result["Filtered Outcome"]
        BD["Bangladesh
Secondary Consideration"]
    end

    US -->|"Indo-Pacific Anchor"| IN
    JP -->|"Quad Partner"| IN
    RU -->|"Arms Market"| IN
    EU -->|"Strategic Partnership"| IN

    IN -->|"Deference
Mediation"| BD

    style IN fill:#e31e24,stroke:#333,color:#fff
    style BD fill:#006a4e,stroke:#333,color:#fff
    style US fill:#f5f5f5,stroke:#333
    style JP fill:#f5f5f5,stroke:#333
    style RU fill:#f5f5f5,stroke:#333
    style EU fill:#f5f5f5,stroke:#333

  

This prism has profound consequences. It means Bangladesh’s interests are systematically subordinated to how they affect India. It means bilateral relationships become trilateral by default. It means 170 million people are treated as appendages to a larger neighbor rather than principals in their own right.

America’s India Filter

The Strategic Framework

The United States has structured its South Asia policy around India since the 2005 US-India Civil Nuclear Agreement, which marked Washington’s decisive tilt toward New Delhi as a counterweight to China. Under this framework, Bangladesh and Pakistan became secondary considerations — assessed primarily through the lens of how they affect Indian interests.

The Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy made this explicit:

“We will support India’s continued rise and regional leadership… We are working with India bilaterally and through groupings such as the Quad to promote regional security.”

Bangladesh does not feature as a partner. It features, if at all, as part of “the region” over which India exercises “leadership.” The message is clear: Washington talks to Delhi about the neighborhood; it does not talk to the neighborhood independently.

The Practical Consequences

This framework produced concrete policy distortions:

1. Electoral Silence: When Sheikh Hasina conducted increasingly fraudulent elections in 2014, 2018, and 2024, American criticism was muted. Washington’s primary concern was maintaining the India-aligned government in Dhaka, not Bangladeshi democracy.

2. Trade as Afterthought: Despite being among America’s largest apparel suppliers, Bangladesh received minimal attention in US trade policy. India received Strategic Trade Authorization and defense technology access; Bangladesh received generic GSP treatment.

3. Security Cooperation Vacuum: While the US built comprehensive defense partnerships with India (LEMOA, COMCASA, BECA agreements), Bangladesh-US security cooperation remained minimal — not because Bangladesh was uninterested, but because Washington saw no strategic value in cultivating independent Dhaka ties.

The 2025 Recalibration

The fall of Sheikh Hasina in August 2024 forced a Washington reassessment. The new interim government under Muhammad Yunus showed independence from India — and suddenly, Bangladesh mattered.

The Stimson Center noted: “U.S. foreign policy toward South Asia’s sub-regions and its diverse populations would be best served by treating each nation… on individual terms, not through the legacy framework of Cold War-era regional blocs or contemporary Indo-Pacific power competition.”

The question is whether this represents a genuine policy shift or a temporary adjustment.

Japan’s Bangladesh-as-Transit Framework

The Connectivity Concept

Japan’s approach to Bangladesh is explicitly framed as serving Indian connectivity. The “Bay of Bengal Industrial Growth Belt” (BIG-B) initiative and the “Industrial Value Chain Concept Connecting Bay of Bengal and Northeast India” make this architecture clear.

Consider how Japan describes its own flagship investment — the Matarbari Deep Sea Port:

“Creating an economic zone of 300 million people by connecting Kolkata and Dhaka with Matarbari Port.”

Bangladesh is not the destination; it is the connection. The port is designed to serve India’s landlocked northeastern states. The highways being built with Japanese loans lead to Indian borders. The value chain terminates in India.

The FOIP Framework

Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy explicitly conceptualizes Bangladesh through the “Bay of Bengal-Northeast India value chain.” In this framing, Bangladesh provides:

• Transit access to India’s northeast
• Labor-cost advantages for Japanese manufacturing
• Port infrastructure serving Indian trade

What Bangladesh does not represent in this framework is a strategic partner in its own right. Japanese investment is substantial — Matarbari alone involves $4.6 billion in loans — but the strategic logic centers on India.

The Unstated Assumption

Japan’s Bangladesh policy operates on an unstated assumption: that Bangladesh remains aligned with India, ensuring Japanese investments serve their intended purpose of connecting to Indian markets. The fall of the Hasina government disrupted this assumption. A Bangladesh that is not automatically aligned with India is a Bangladesh where Japanese investments may serve different strategic purposes.

This creates both risk and opportunity for Dhaka. The risk is that Japanese enthusiasm for Bangladesh investment may wane if the India-connectivity logic breaks down. The opportunity is to reframe Japanese engagement as bilateral partnership rather than triangulated investment.

Russia’s Delhi Deference

The Historical Pattern

Russia’s approach to Bangladesh is the most explicitly deferential to India of any major power. The Observer Research Foundation, India’s premier think tank, noted plainly:

“Moscow generally defers to Delhi on matters concerning its neighbors.”

This deference has deep historical roots. The Soviet Union backed India’s intervention in the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War, deploying naval forces to deter US intervention and vetoing UN Security Council resolutions. But this support was for India, not Bangladesh — the new nation was valuable primarily as a strategic gain for Delhi.

The Stunning Statistic

No Soviet or Russian foreign minister visited Bangladesh until September 2023 — 52 years after independence. This astonishing diplomatic gap reflects Moscow’s consistent treatment of Bangladesh as India’s responsibility rather than an independent relationship worth cultivating.

When Russia does engage with Bangladesh, it often does so with Indian facilitation. The Rooppur Nuclear Power Plant — Russia’s flagship project in Bangladesh — saw both Putin and Hasina publicly acknowledge India’s contribution to making the project possible. A $12 billion Russian investment in Bangladesh was framed, in part, as an India-mediated achievement.

The Alignment Correlation

Russia-Bangladesh relations have consistently tracked Bangladesh’s alignment with India:

timeline
    title Russia-Bangladesh Relations Timeline: Tracking India Alignment
    section Strong India Alignment
        1972-1975 : Mujib (AL)
                  : Russia: Positive
        1996-2001 : Hasina (AL)
                  : Russia: Warming
        2009-2024 : Hasina (AL)
                  : Russia: Deepening
                  : Rooppur Nuclear Plant
                  : First FM Visit (2023)
    section Weak/Neutral India Alignment
        1975-1981 : Military (Zia)
                  : Russia: Distant
        1991-1996 : Khaleda (BNP)
                  : Russia: Minimal
        2001-2006 : Khaleda (BNP)
                  : Russia: Stagnant

  

The pattern is unmistakable: Russia engages Bangladesh primarily when Dhaka is aligned with Delhi. Moscow does not see Bangladesh as an independent relationship worth cultivating on its own terms.

Post-Hasina Uncertainty

The fall of Hasina has created uncertainty in Moscow. Russia’s approach under the new government will reveal whether Moscow can develop independent Bangladesh ties or remains locked in the India-deference framework.

The European Union’s India-Centric Architecture

The Symbolic Indignity

When Bangladeshi citizens need EU visas, many must travel to New Delhi. The EU operates visa application centers in India that process Bangladesh applications — a practical arrangement that carries profound symbolic weight.

A Bangladeshi citizen seeking to visit Europe must first seek permission from infrastructure located in India. National sovereignty is literally filtered through Indian territory.

Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus raised this issue directly with EU officials in late 2024, requesting that visa services be relocated to Dhaka. The request was practical, but the symbolism was unmistakable: Bangladesh demanding to be treated as an independent nation rather than an appendage of India.

The Partnership Hierarchy

The EU maintains a “Strategic Partnership” with India — one of only ten such partnerships globally. Bangladesh has no equivalent arrangement. The EU-India relationship includes:

• Annual summits at heads of government level
• Comprehensive trade and investment negotiations
• Security and defense cooperation
• Technology partnerships

EU-Bangladesh relations, by contrast, are structured primarily around trade (GSP/EBA preferences) and development assistance. Bangladesh is a recipient of EU policy, not a partner in shaping it.

The Dual Safe Country Designation

In 2024, the EU designated both Bangladesh and India as “safe countries of origin” for asylum purposes — a technical migration policy decision that nonetheless illustrated how Brussels views the two nations as a paired set rather than independent considerations.

LDC Graduation: The Looming Challenge

Bangladesh faces graduation from Least Developed Country (LDC) status in 2026, which will end duty-free EU market access under the Everything But Arms (EBA) scheme. This represents Bangladesh’s most significant EU relationship challenge — yet negotiations have proceeded with minimal urgency on the European side.

Compare this to EU engagement with India on trade issues, where high-level political attention drives policy. Bangladesh’s trade challenges are treated as technical matters; India’s are treated as strategic priorities.

Why Powers Support India: The Strategic Calculus

Understanding why major powers have adopted the India lens requires examining the strategic incentives that make this framework rational — from their perspective.

The United States: The China Counterweight Logic

Washington’s India-first approach rests on a clear strategic calculation: India is the only Asian power with the scale, democratic credentials, and geographic position to balance China.

The American calculus:

As Dr. Ashley Tellis of the Carnegie Endowment observed: “India is the only country in Asia that can provide the heft necessary to balance Chinese power over the long term.” This logic makes Bangladesh strategically invisible — not because it lacks value, but because India’s scale dominates American strategic imagination.

The flaw in this logic: India has consistently refused to align with the US on key issues — Ukraine sanctions, Russia relations, Israel-Palestine. India takes American support while pursuing “strategic autonomy” from Washington. Meanwhile, Bangladesh offers a more reliable partner in a strategically vital location — if Washington would look.

Japan: The Quad Partner Premium

Tokyo’s India-centric Bangladesh policy reflects the Japan-India special relationship within the Quad framework. Prime Minister Abe’s “Special Strategic and Global Partnership” with India created institutional incentives to view South Asia through Delhi.

Japan’s reasoning:

1. Quad solidarity: Supporting India’s regional role strengthens the Japan-India leg of the Quad
2. China containment: India as first line of defense against Chinese expansion
3. Infrastructure competition: Countering Belt and Road requires an anchor partner — India is chosen
4. Defense sales: India is a major market for Japanese military technology

The flaw in this logic: Japan’s Bangladesh investments actually serve Bangladeshi development, regardless of framing. Matarbari Port benefits Bangladesh whether it connects to India or not. By explicitly framing investments as India-connectivity, Japan undermines goodwill in Dhaka without strategic gain.

Russia: The Arms Market Dependency

Moscow’s deference to Delhi is fundamentally commercial. India accounts for approximately 25-30% of Russian arms exports — a relationship worth billions annually and irreplaceable given Western sanctions.

Russia’s calculation:

• Arms exports: India purchased $13 billion in Russian weapons (2018-2022)
• Nuclear cooperation: Kudankulam plant and future projects
• Strategic partnership: India provides diplomatic cover at UN, refuses to condemn Ukraine invasion
• Historical ties: Decades of institutional relationships, officer training, technology sharing

The flaw in this logic: Over-dependence on India leaves Russia vulnerable to Indian leverage. Developing independent South Asian relationships — including Bangladesh — would diversify Russia’s regional position. The Rooppur plant demonstrates that major projects are possible; Russia simply hasn’t tried.

European Union: The Market Size Hierarchy

Brussels views South Asia through the lens of market size and trade volumes. India’s economy is eight times Bangladesh’s size; the attention gap follows.

The EU’s framework:

• Trade volume: EU-India trade exceeds €120 billion; EU-Bangladesh trade is €20 billion
• FDI destination: European firms prioritize Indian market access
• Strategic weight: India as BRICS member, G20 founder, UN Security Council aspirant
• Diaspora influence: Larger Indian diaspora in Europe shapes political attention

The flaw in this logic: Bangladesh’s smaller size makes it a more manageable partner. LDC graduation creates an opportunity for EU-Bangladesh relations reset — if Brussels engages at political rather than technical level.

India’s Deteriorating Foundations: The Husk Behind the Promise

Major powers have invested heavily in the India narrative — but increasingly, that narrative sells a husk without substance. Beneath the rhetoric of “world’s largest democracy” and “fastest-growing major economy” lies a deteriorating political landscape, a troubled economic reality, and an investment climate that frustrates rather than rewards partners.

Political Deterioration: Democracy in Name Only

The “democratic credentials” that supposedly make India a natural Western partner have eroded dramatically under the Modi government.

Democratic backsliding indicators:

As Dr. Pratap Bhanu Mehta, former Vice Chancellor of Ashoka University, observed: “India’s democratic institutions are being hollowed out from within. The facade remains, but the substance has been gutted.”

Specific deterioration:

1. Press Freedom Collapse: Journalists arrested, media outlets raided, and critical coverage suppressed. The Pegasus spyware scandal revealed government surveillance of journalists and opposition figures.

2. Judicial Capture: The Supreme Court’s independence has been compromised through selective appointments and delayed hearings on politically sensitive cases.

3. Electoral Manipulation: The Election Commission’s neutrality is questioned after its commissioners became BJP appointees and enforcement against the ruling party disappeared.

4. Minority Persecution: The Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) explicitly discriminates against Muslims. Communal violence in Gujarat, Delhi, and Manipur has killed hundreds with minimal accountability.

5. Opposition Suppression: Enforcement agencies (ED, CBI, IT) systematically target opposition leaders with investigations that evaporate after they join the ruling party.

The implication for partners: Powers that cite India’s “democratic values” as reason for partnership are aligning with an increasingly authoritarian state. Bangladesh’s July 2024 democratic revolution offers a genuine — not rhetorical — commitment to democratic governance.

Economic Reality: Jobless Growth and Manufacturing Failure

India’s economic narrative — “fastest-growing major economy,” “demographic dividend,” “manufacturing hub” — conceals structural failures that undermine the partnership promise.

The headline vs. the reality:

The employment crisis:

• Unemployment: Official unemployment at 8%+, but broader measures suggest 20%+ underemployment
• Job creation: India needs 12 million new jobs annually; it creates fewer than 5 million
• Quality of employment: 90% of workforce remains in informal sector with no protections
• Graduate unemployment: 33% of graduates are unemployed — higher education produces credentials without opportunities

As economist Jayati Ghosh noted: “India has achieved growth without development. GDP numbers rise while living standards stagnate for the majority.”

Manufacturing failure:

India was supposed to become “the next China” in manufacturing. Instead:

• Share of global manufacturing: China 31%, India 3%
• Manufacturing employment: Declined from 51 million (2016) to 35 million (2023)
• Export composition: Still dominated by low-value goods; high-tech exports minimal
• Supply chain integration: India excluded from major global supply chains that bypassed it for Vietnam, Bangladesh, Indonesia

The implication for partners: Companies seeking manufacturing alternatives to China consistently choose Vietnam, Indonesia, and Bangladesh over India. The “India manufacturing” story is marketing, not reality.

Investment Climate: Regulatory Nightmare

Foreign investors who believed the India narrative have faced a hostile reality: regulatory uncertainty, policy reversals, tax terrorism, and protectionism.

High-profile investment disasters:

Systemic investment problems:

1. Retroactive Taxation: India infamously amended tax law retroactively to pursue Vodafone and Cairn — a signal that no investment is safe from ex post facto extraction.

2. Policy Reversals: E-commerce rules changed after Amazon and Walmart invested billions; renewable energy contracts renegotiated after developers committed capital.

3. Protectionism: “Make in India” increasingly means “exclude foreign companies” through tariff barriers, local content requirements, and regulatory discrimination.

4. Judicial Delays: Commercial disputes take 5-10 years to resolve; contract enforcement ranks among world’s worst (World Bank Doing Business: 163rd).

5. Land Acquisition: Infrastructure projects delayed for decades by land disputes; companies cannot secure sites for manufacturing.

FDI reality check:

• India attracted $85 billion FDI in 2022 — but most went to financial services and software, not manufacturing
• Manufacturing FDI has declined despite “Make in India” rhetoric
• China received $189 billion in 2022; Vietnam $22 billion; Bangladesh $3.5 billion — but Bangladesh’s manufacturing FDI as share of GDP exceeds India’s

The implication for partners: The “India market opportunity” has proven illusory for most foreign investors. Regulatory risk, policy uncertainty, and protectionism make India a difficult market despite its size.

Strategic Unreliability: The Non-Aligned Reality

India consistently frustrates partners by taking their support while refusing to support them on key issues.

India’s pattern of non-delivery:

As former US Ambassador Robert Blackwill candidly assessed: “India will take everything America offers and give as little as possible in return. This is not a flaw in Indian strategy; it is Indian strategy.”

Strategic autonomy as excuse:

India’s “strategic autonomy” doctrine means:

• Taking Western investment while refusing Western alignment
• Accepting Quad membership while hedging with China
• Demanding technology transfer while blocking market access
• Seeking defense partnership while maintaining Russia ties

The implication for partners: India is not a reliable partner — it is a transactional actor that maximizes its own gains while minimizing its commitments. Powers expecting gratitude or reciprocity from India have consistently been disappointed.

2025: The Year Everything Collapsed

If the above analysis seemed theoretical, 2025 provided brutal empirical confirmation. The year delivered India’s most humiliating foreign policy failures in decades:

Operation Sindoor (May 2025):

Following the Pahalgam terrorist attack (April 22, 2025) that killed 26 people, India launched Operation Sindoor — its most extensive military strikes on Pakistan since 1971. But instead of demonstrating strategic autonomy, India ended up needing a bailout.

President Trump announced on May 10 that the US had “mediated” a ceasefire between India and Pakistan. India desperately denied American involvement, but Trump repeatedly claimed credit, embarrassing Modi on the world stage.

The Lowy Institute assessed: “Modi faces a ’re-hyphenation’ challenge after Trump’s Kashmir mediation claims.” India had spent decades keeping Kashmir off the international agenda — Trump undid that with a single Truth Social post.

The verdict was damning: India’s ceasefire “humiliatingly underscored India’s reliance on external powers to manage its regional conflicts — a significant, if not damning, indictment of its strategic autonomy.”

The 50% Tariff Hammer (August 2025):

Trump imposed 50% tariffs on India — 25% “reciprocal” plus 25% for Russian oil purchases. He publicly mocked India as a “dead economy” and “Russia’s laundromat.”

The tariff differential speaks volumes:

• India: 50% tariff → 66.5% effective rate
• Bangladesh: 20% tariff → 36.5% effective rate
• Bangladesh advantage: 30 percentage points

Results were immediate: Bangladesh garment exports to the US surged 21%, orders shifted from India to Bangladesh, and Chinese manufacturers began relocating to Bangladesh.

India-US Relations at Historic Low:

Despite Modi’s February 2025 Washington visit, the relationship collapsed:

• Pakistan’s Army Chief Munir visited the White House twice since the May conflict
• Trump explicitly targeted India’s “strategic autonomy” as the problem
• India’s “indispensability” was exposed as myth

As Foreign Policy concluded: “2025 has brutally exposed the limitations of India’s strategic autonomy approach. What was once hailed as diplomatic dexterity is now increasingly viewed by global capitals as transactional aloofness.”

2025 has been called “Modi’s most difficult foreign-policy year” since 2014.

The Contrast: Bangladesh Delivers

While India sells narrative, Bangladesh delivers results:

Bangladesh’s garment sector success demonstrates what India’s “Make in India” promised but failed to deliver:

• From zero to $50 billion in exports in four decades
• 4 million formal sector jobs created
• Global supply chain integration achieved
• Consistent delivery to international buyers

The bottom line: Major powers are backing a deteriorating partner while ignoring a rising one. India offers narrative; Bangladesh offers results.

Bangladesh’s Alternative Narrative

India’s framing has dominated how major powers understand South Asia. Bangladesh must articulate a counter-narrative — one that presents Dhaka not as an India appendage but as an independent actor offering distinct strategic value.

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        direction TB
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        C2 --> C3["Bangladesh as Appendage"]
    end

    subgraph Target["Target: Direct Engagement"]
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        T1["Powers See Bangladesh"]
        T2["Bay of Bengal Power"]
        T3["Reliable Partner"]
        T4["Democratic Model"]
        T5["Connector State"]
        T6["Climate Leader"]
        T1 --> T2
        T1 --> T3
        T1 --> T4
        T1 --> T5
        T1 --> T6
    end

    Current -->|"Strategic
Repositioning"| Target

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The India Narrative vs. Bangladesh Counter-Narrative

Alternative 1: The Bay of Bengal Power

Bangladesh should reframe itself as a Bay of Bengal maritime power, not merely an India neighbor.

The narrative: “Bangladesh commands the head of the Bay of Bengal — one of the world’s most strategic waterways. Our 118,813 square kilometer Exclusive Economic Zone, our position athwart Indian Ocean shipping lanes, and our Blue Economy potential make us an Indo-Pacific actor in our own right.”

The evidence:

• Bay of Bengal carries 40% of global shipping
• Bangladesh EEZ contains significant hydrocarbon and fishing resources
• Strategic position relevant to Indo-Pacific maritime competition
• Blue Economy potential valued at $6.2 billion annually

The appeal to powers: This narrative offers the US and Japan a Bay of Bengal partner independent of India. It offers Russia and EU access to Indo-Pacific positioning without Indian mediation.

Alternative 2: The Reliable Development Partner

While India pursues “strategic autonomy” and plays powers against each other, Bangladesh can position itself as a reliable development partner.

The narrative: “Bangladesh delivers. Our garment sector built the world’s clothing supply chain. Our labor force is disciplined, our governance improving, our commitments honored. India hedges; Bangladesh commits.”

The evidence:

• Garment sector grew from zero to $50 billion in four decades
• Consistent economic growth: 6-8% annually for two decades
• Development indicators outperforming South Asian neighbors
• Track record of honoring international commitments

The appeal to powers: For investors and partners burned by Indian protectionism and regulatory unpredictability, Bangladesh offers a more reliable alternative.

Alternative 3: The Democratic Transition Model

Bangladesh’s July 2024 revolution offers a powerful narrative for Western engagement.

The narrative: “Bangladesh overthrew an authoritarian regime through people power. Our democratic transition demonstrates that South Asia can choose self-governance over strongman rule. Supporting Bangladesh’s democracy supports democratic values globally.”

The evidence:

• Student-led revolution ended 15 years of authoritarian rule
• Peaceful transition to interim government
• Commitment to electoral reform and democratic institutions
• Popular mandate for democratic governance

The appeal to powers: For the US and EU, which nominally prioritize democracy, Bangladesh’s transition offers vindication of democratic values. India, by contrast, is sliding toward illiberalism — supporting Bangladesh democracy is supporting the alternative path.

Alternative 4: The Connector State

Bangladesh can position itself as a connector between competing blocs rather than a satellite of any single power.

The narrative: “Bangladesh trades with all, aligns with none. We are the bridge between East and West, between China and India, between developed and developing worlds. Our strategic value lies in connectivity, not confrontation.”

The evidence:

• Trade relationships with China, India, US, EU, Japan simultaneously
• Membership in both China-led and Western-adjacent institutions
• Geographic position enabling multiple connectivity corridors
• History of maintaining relationships across geopolitical divides

The appeal to powers: In an era of bifurcating blocs, connector states gain importance. Bangladesh offers all powers access without exclusive commitment.

Alternative 5: The Climate Frontline Partner

Bangladesh’s acute climate vulnerability creates partnership opportunities.

The narrative: “Bangladesh is on the frontline of climate change — but also the frontline of adaptation innovation. Partner with us to develop, test, and scale climate solutions for the developing world.”

The evidence:

• Sea level rise threatens 17% of national territory
• Climate adaptation investments exceeding $1 billion annually
• Innovation in flood management, cyclone preparedness, agricultural adaptation
• Model for developing world climate response

The appeal to powers: For the EU and US with climate commitments, Bangladesh offers a laboratory for climate partnership. This is a relationship where Bangladesh brings expertise, not just need.

Operationalizing the Alternative Narrative

Narrative without action is rhetoric. Bangladesh must operationalize these alternative framings through:

Institutional Initiatives

1. Bay of Bengal Security Forum: Dhaka-led maritime security dialogue bypassing India
2. Climate Adaptation Partnership: Formal framework for climate cooperation with major powers
3. Democratic Transition Initiative: Sharing Bangladesh’s experience with other nations in transition

Diplomatic Messaging

1. Consistent framing: All ministries and diplomats articulating the same alternative narrative
2. Think tank engagement: Funding research that reinforces Bangladesh’s independent positioning
3. Media strategy: Placing Bangladesh stories in international media independent of India framing

Strategic Actions

1. Diversified relationships: Active engagement with powers that see Bangladesh value
2. Regional leadership: Initiating Bay of Bengal cooperation without waiting for Indian approval
3. Selective connectivity: Accepting transit arrangements only on equitable terms

The Post-August 2024 Opportunity

The fall of Sheikh Hasina on August 5, 2024, has created a unique window for Bangladesh to escape the India lens. For the first time in 15 years, all four major power centers are forced to engage with a Bangladesh government that is not automatically aligned with India.

The Signals of Change

1. United States: Washington has engaged directly with the Yunus government on trade, democracy, and regional security — treating Bangladesh as a principal rather than an India appendage. The 20% tariff reduction secured in early 2025 resulted from direct negotiation.

2. Japan: Tokyo faces questions about whether its India-connectivity investments still serve intended purposes. This creates space for Bangladesh to reframe Japanese engagement as bilateral partnership.

3. Russia: Moscow must decide whether to develop independent Bangladesh ties or wait for a future India-aligned government. The Rooppur plant creates ongoing engagement regardless of political alignment.

4. European Union: Yunus’s direct request on visa centers signals Bangladesh’s demand for sovereign treatment. The post-Hasina dynamic enables more assertive engagement on GSP, LDC graduation, and partnership status.

The Strategic Autonomy Imperative

Escaping the India lens requires more than diplomatic rhetoric. It requires:

1. Diversified Relationships: Bangladesh must cultivate ties with multiple powers that see Dhaka as valuable in its own right, not merely as a function of India policy.

2. Economic Independence: Reducing dependence on India-transited trade and Indian-facilitated investment creates space for independent foreign policy.

3. Regional Leadership: Bangladesh must position itself as a Bay of Bengal leader, not merely an India neighbor — engaging Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and ASEAN on its own terms.

4. Strategic Clarity: Dhaka must articulate what it offers major powers independently: market access, strategic geography, demographic dividend, Blue Economy potential.

The Trap to Avoid

Escaping the India lens does not mean falling into a China lens or a Pakistan lens. The goal is strategic autonomy — the capacity to engage all powers on Bangladesh’s own terms, extracting value from multiple relationships without becoming anyone’s client state.

Some in Dhaka may be tempted to simply flip from India’s orbit to China’s. This would be a strategic miscalculation. It would replace one form of dependency with another, potentially more constraining form. As Dr. C. Raja Mohan, Senior Fellow at the Asia Society Policy Institute, has noted: “For smaller South Asian states, the challenge is not choosing between major powers but developing the capacity to engage all of them on advantageous terms.” China’s debt sustainability concerns and strategic demands require the same careful management as India’s regional influence preferences.

The correct posture is what scholars call “multi-alignment” or “connector state” strategy: trading widely, negotiating confidently, committing to none, and extracting maximum benefit from strategic competition without becoming its victim.

The Path Forward

Breaking the India lens requires sustained effort across multiple fronts:

With the United States

• Emphasize bilateral value: market access, strategic geography, democracy partnership
• Request specific treatment: trade negotiations, security cooperation, development partnership
• Resist being folded back into “Indo-Pacific with India at center” frameworks

With Japan

• Reframe investments as serving Bangladesh development, not merely India connectivity
• Propose bilateral strategic dialogue at senior levels
• Seek technology transfer and capability building, not just infrastructure loans

With Russia

• Develop direct institutional ties: foreign ministry exchanges, parliamentary relationships
• Seek defense cooperation independent of Indian facilitation
• Propose energy and nuclear cooperation beyond Rooppur

With the European Union

• Push for EU-Bangladesh Strategic Partnership status
• Negotiate GSP+ transition aggressively before LDC graduation
• Demand Dhaka-based visa services as a sovereignty matter
• Engage European parliaments directly on Bangladesh issues

Policy Recommendations for Bangladesh

The following recommendations are directed at Bangladesh’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chief Adviser’s Office, and relevant government bodies. These are actionable steps to break the India lens and establish Bangladesh as an independent actor in great power calculations.

Immediate Actions (0-6 Months)

1. Establish a Strategic Communications Unit

Create a dedicated unit within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to coordinate Bangladesh’s international narrative:

• Staffing: 5-7 professionals with international communications experience
• Mandate: Develop and disseminate consistent messaging across all embassies
• Output: Weekly briefing materials, talking points for diplomats, op-ed placement
• Budget: Allocate BDT 50 crore annually for strategic communications

2. Conduct Embassy Audits

Review Bangladesh’s diplomatic presence in the four key capitals:

3. Commission Counter-Narrative Research

Fund research at international think tanks that presents Bangladesh independently:

• Target institutions: Brookings, CSIS, Chatham House, IISS, Carnegie
• Budget: $500,000-1,000,000 annually for research grants
• Output: 10-15 policy papers annually presenting Bangladesh’s independent value
• Approach: Joint research with Bangladeshi institutions (BIISS, CPD, BIDS)

Short-Term Actions (6-18 Months)

4. Launch the Bay of Bengal Initiative

Position Bangladesh as the convener of Bay of Bengal cooperation:

• Proposed forum: Bay of Bengal Dialogue (BBD) — annual ministerial meeting
• Initial members: Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia
• Secretariat: Based in Dhaka, funded by Bangladesh with partner contributions
• Agenda: Maritime security, fisheries, climate adaptation, shipping lanes
• Strategic purpose: Establish Bangladesh leadership role independent of India

5. Negotiate Bilateral Framework Agreements

Pursue formal bilateral frameworks with each major power:

6. Restructure Trade Negotiation Capacity

Build professional trade negotiation teams:

• Create: Trade Negotiation Cell within Ministry of Commerce (15-20 specialists)
• Train: Send 50 officials for WTO/trade negotiation training over 3 years
• Hire: 5-7 international trade lawyers on contract for major negotiations
• Coordinate: Weekly inter-ministerial trade strategy meetings

Medium-Term Actions (18-36 Months)

7. Develop Defense Diversification Strategy

Reduce dependence on any single defense supplier:

• Immediate: Open defense dialogue with US, UK, France, Turkey
• Procurement: Diversify next major acquisitions across suppliers
• Training: Send officers to Western military academies
• Exercises: Participate in multilateral exercises beyond China-centric ones

8. Build Diaspora Political Capacity

Organize Bangladeshi diaspora communities for political engagement:

• United States: Register Bangladeshi-American Political Action Committee
• United Kingdom: Strengthen British Bangladeshi engagement with Parliament
• European Union: Coordinate diaspora advocacy across EU member states
• Budget: BDT 20 crore annually for diaspora engagement programs

9. Establish Climate Diplomacy Leadership

Position Bangladesh as the voice of climate-vulnerable nations:

• Platform: Lead Climate Vulnerable Forum (CVF) with enhanced activism
• Demand: Dedicated Bangladesh seat in major climate negotiations
• Partnership: Propose EU-Bangladesh Climate Adaptation Partnership
• Expertise export: Offer Bangladeshi adaptation expertise to other vulnerable nations

Institutional Reforms

10. Create Foreign Policy Coordination Mechanism

Establish formal coordination between foreign policy-relevant ministries:

• Body: National Foreign Policy Council (NFPC)
• Chair: Chief Adviser / Prime Minister
• Members: Foreign Affairs, Commerce, Finance, Defence, Planning ministers
• Secretariat: Joint Secretary-level from each ministry
• Meeting: Monthly on strategic issues; quarterly comprehensive review

11. Reform Foreign Service Recruitment and Training

Modernize the Bangladesh Foreign Service:

12. Establish Strategic Affairs Think Tank

Create a government-affiliated but editorially independent policy institution:

• Name: Bangladesh Institute for Strategic Affairs (BISA)
• Mandate: Produce policy research on Bangladesh’s strategic positioning
• Funding: Government core funding + international grants
• Independence: Editorial independence guaranteed; international advisory board
• Output: Quarterly journal, monthly policy briefs, annual strategic assessment

Specific Diplomatic Instructions

For Ambassadors in Washington, Tokyo, Moscow, and Brussels:

1. Never accept trilateral framing: When counterparts reference India in Bangladesh discussions, redirect to bilateral agenda

2. Proactively articulate value: In every meeting, state what Bangladesh offers independently:

   • “Bangladesh provides Bay of Bengal access independent of India”
   • “Our $50 billion garment sector demonstrates delivery capacity”
   • “Our democratic transition aligns with [US/EU] values”

3. Request specific treatment: Always ask for Bangladesh-specific programs, not “South Asia” initiatives:

   • “We request a dedicated Bangladesh desk, not a South Asia desk”
   • “We seek bilateral trade negotiations, not regional frameworks”

4. Build personal relationships: Cultivate relationships with mid-level officials who will become senior officials:

   • Deputy Assistant Secretaries, not just Assistant Secretaries
   • European Commission officials, not just Commissioners
   • Junior Diet members in Japan, not just senior politicians

5. Engage legislatures directly: Parliaments often offer more space than executives:

   • US Congress: Bangladesh Caucus revival
   • European Parliament: Bangladesh Friendship Group
   • Japanese Diet: Cross-party Bangladesh study group
   • Russian Duma: Parliamentary friendship society

Key Performance Indicators

Track progress with measurable indicators:

Warning Signs to Monitor

Watch for signs that the India lens is reasserting:

1. Trilateral proposals: Offers to include India in bilateral discussions
2. Regional packaging: Bangladesh grouped with “South Asia” or “India’s neighbors”
3. Deference requests: Suggestions to “coordinate with Delhi” before engaging
4. Conditionality: Aid or trade benefits linked to India-related conditions
5. Backchanneling: Evidence that counterparts are checking with Delhi before responding

Response protocol: Document each instance, raise at next bilateral meeting, escalate to senior levels if pattern persists.

Conclusion: Seeing and Being Seen

The India lens is not a conspiracy. It is a structural feature of how major powers economize on attention and complexity. India is large, nuclear-armed, economically significant, and strategically located. Bangladesh is smaller, non-nuclear, and has been reliably aligned with India for 15 years. The path of least resistance for Washington, Tokyo, Moscow, and Brussels has been to engage Bangladesh through Delhi.

But structural features can be changed. The post-August 2024 moment offers Bangladesh an unprecedented opportunity to demand direct engagement — to insist that 170 million people deserve to be seen on their own terms, not filtered through a neighbor’s interests.

The India lens will not break itself. Dhaka must break it — through assertive diplomacy, diversified relationships, and the clear articulation of Bangladesh’s independent value. The alternative is permanent subordination: a nation of 170 million treated as a footnote in someone else’s story.

This Issue Brief represents the analysis of the Inqilab Delta Forum research team.

Sources:

1. The White House, “Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States,” February 2022.
2. Stimson Center, “Rethinking U.S. South Asia Policy,” Policy Brief, December 2024.
3. Observer Research Foundation, “Russia-Bangladesh Relations: The India Factor,” ORF Issue Brief No. 523, September 2023.
4. Japan International Cooperation Agency, “Bay of Bengal Industrial Growth Belt (BIG-B) Initiative,” Project Documentation, 2024.
5. European External Action Service, “EU-India Strategic Partnership: A Roadmap to 2025,” Brussels, 2020.
6. East-West Center, “South Asia in U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy,” Policy Studies No. 89, December 2024.
7. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “India as a Leading Power,” Ashley Tellis, 2024.
8. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “Arms Transfers to India 2018-2022,” SIPRI Fact Sheet, 2023.
9. World Bank, “Bangladesh Blue Economy Development,” Technical Report, 2024.
10. International Monetary Fund, “World Economic Outlook Database,” October 2024.
11. Reporters Without Borders, “World Press Freedom Index 2024,” RSF, 2024.
12. V-Dem Institute, “Democracy Report 2024: Autocratization Changing Nature,” University of Gothenburg, 2024.
13. Freedom House, “Freedom in the World 2024: India Country Report,” 2024.
14. Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE), “Unemployment Statistics,” December 2024.
15. Reserve Bank of India, “Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy,” 2024.
16. UNCTAD, “World Investment Report 2024,” United Nations, 2024.
17. Permanent Court of Arbitration, “Vodafone International Holdings B.V. v. India,” Award, 2020.
18. Council on Foreign Relations, “India’s Strategic Autonomy and U.S.-India Relations,” Blackwill and Tellis, 2024.

Related Analysis:

• America’s South Asia Reset: From India-First to Bilateral Pragmatism — How US policy is shifting from treating Bangladesh as an India appendage
• Japan’s Bangladesh Paradox: Investments for India’s Benefit? — Examining whether Japanese investments serve India or Bangladesh
• Russia’s Delhi Deference: How India Mediates Bangladesh-Moscow Relations — Analyzing Russia’s historical deference to India on Bangladesh policy
• The Visa Center Problem: Why Bangladeshis Must Go to Delhi for Europe — Using EU visa policy as a lens on broader EU-Bangladesh relations