Analysis and commentary on Bangladesh's political economy, foreign policy, and strategic affairs.
Comprehensive analysis of Bangladesh-specific policy developments across major powers during second week of January 2026, with strategic implications and recommended action areas.
Policy brief proposing civilian protection mechanisms and accountability frameworks for India-Bangladesh border management, addressing ongoing concerns about border shootings and human rights violations.
India's Northeast — the 'Seven Sisters' with 40 million people — is connected to the Indian mainland by only a 22 km strip of land. Dhaka holds the key to solving India's geographic nightmare, but Bangladesh has never leveraged this advantage. The post-August 2024 era demands strategic recalibration.
When Bangladeshi citizens need EU visas, many must travel to New Delhi — a symbolic indignity that reflects broader EU-Bangladesh relationship failures. As LDC graduation approaches, Bangladesh must demand treatment as an independent nation, not an India appendage.
Major global powers have historically viewed Bangladesh not as an independent actor but through an 'India lens' — treating Dhaka as a subset of Delhi policy. This prism distorts how Washington, Tokyo, Moscow, and Brussels engage with a nation of 170 million, but post-August 2024 dynamics are forcing a recalibration.
Moscow 'generally defers to Delhi on matters concerning its neighbors' — a pattern so pronounced that no Soviet/Russian foreign minister visited Bangladesh until 2023, 52 years after independence. The Rooppur nuclear plant exemplifies this triangulated relationship.
Japan has invested billions in Bangladesh infrastructure — but Tokyo's strategic framework explicitly conceptualizes these investments as serving India connectivity. The question for Dhaka: can Japanese investment be reframed as bilateral partnership rather than triangulated development?
The 2025 shift in US policy from treating Bangladesh as a subset of India policy to engaging Dhaka on its own terms represents a potential paradigm shift — but whether it survives the next administration remains uncertain.
A policy alternative exists: India as 'well-wisher' rather than 'big brother'—pursuing genuine partnership that serves both nations' interests rather than Indian dominance.
India's Bangladesh policy is driven by short-term electoral calculations—Hindu persecution narratives, anti-Bangladesh rhetoric, and support for a controllable ally—at catastrophic cost to India's long-term strategic interests.